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Christopher D. Jenkins*

The Institutional and Substantive
Effects of the Human Rights Act
in the United Kingdom

This article reviews the institutional and substantive impact that the Human Rights
Act has on English law through its incorporation of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Under the Act, higher courts can now move beyond a formalistic
method of judicial review and substantively evaluate legislation in light of the
Convention. The judiciary can accordingly issue declarations that statutes are
incompatible with the Convention which, although not invalidating the act in
question, will bring considerable political pressure to bear on Parliament to ensure
compliance. The Act further directs courts to give special regard to the decisions of
the European Court ofHuman Rights when considering cases involving Convention
rights. This new source of jurisprudence, along with the Convention, brings a
positive conception of rights into English law that conflicts with the negative
conception foundin the common lawandtheAct's attempts topreservepariamentary
sovereignty. Where authority from the European Court is lacking, English courts in
the future will have to anticipate its response by engaging in a teleological approach
to rights interpretation that is based on broad principles rather than textual
formalism. Nevertheless, the common law should successfully accommodate
these developments into its own framework.
L'auteur examine les retomb6es institutionnelles et materielles de la Loi sur les
droits de la personne de 1998 (Human Rights Act 1998), enchiss6e dans la
Convention europeenne sur les droits de I'homme, sur le droit britannique. Aux
termes de la loi, les cours supdrieures ne sont plus limit6es a un examen judiciaire
formaliste etpeuvent dor6navant se prononcer sur le fond des lois a la lumiere des
dispositions de la Convention. En cons6quence, la magistrature peut d6clarerune
loi incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention, auquel cas, m~me si la Ioi
en question ne s'en trouvepas invalid6e d'office, le parlement risque de taire robjet
de pressions politiques considdrables visant a modifier la Ioi en question pour la
rendre conforme. Deplus, selon les dispositions de la Loisurles droits de I'homme,
le tribunal doit prendre en compte les d6cisions de la Cour europ6enne des droits
de I'homme dans toute d6cision mettant en cause les droits dtablis par la
Convention. Cette nouvelle source de jurisprudence de m~me que les dispositions
de la Convention inscritdans le droitbritannique une conception positive des droits
de la personne qui se trouve en heurt avec la conception negative de la common
lawde m6me que les dispositions de la Loisurles droits de I'homme ayantpourbut
de maintenir la souverainet6 du parlement. En I'absence de decisions pr6alables
de la Coureurop6enne des droits de I'homme, a I'avenir, les tribunaux britanniques
devront anticiper la r6action de cette derniere. I/s devront donc adopter une
approche t6ldologique ax6e sur les principes de fond plut6t que de s'appuyer sur
la lettre de la loi afin d'interpr~ter les droits de la personne. N6anmoins, il y a lieu
d'esp6rer que la common law r6ussira a s'accommodera cette nouvelle donne. I.
Rights Adjudication in the United Kingdom and the Human Rights Act 1998.
* Attorney-at-Law (West Virginia, Ohio); B.A., M.A. (pol. sci.), M.A. (hist.), J.D.; LL.M.
candidate, McGill University Institute of Comparative Law.
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II. Institutionaland Substantive Effects of the Human Rights Act
1. InstitutionalEffects
2. Substantive Effects
Conclusion
Introduction
In October 2000, the Human RightsAct 1998 (HRA)' came into effect in
the United Kingdom. As the first written guarantee of rights since the Bill
of Rights of 1689, the Act represents a landmark in the constitutional
history of the nation. The Act incorporates the European Convention on
Human Rights (Convention) directly into English law. It requires that
legislation be read and given effect in a manner that is compatible with
the Convention rights and takes into account the decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights. It further provides that courts may issue statements
declaring parliamentary legislation incompatible with its requirements. 2
The Act will have significant effects on English law. First, the HRA
places effective political limits upon the sovereignty of Parliament and
grants the judiciary the power to review legislation in a substantive
manner for the first time. Underlying this change is a theoretical shift
away from a formal concept ofjudicial review. Secondly, the incorporation
of the Convention introduces a new body of rights jurisprudence directly
into English law. Under the Act, English courts will now have to give
greater regard to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and
confront new approaches to rights adjudication. Therefore, the process of
incorporation fundamentally entails a clash between the negative
conception of rights inherent in the common law and the more positive
interpretation of Convention rights advanced by the European Court of
Human Rights. In addition, English courts, in engaging in substantive
review and having to interpret the Convention, must now consider a
teleological approach to rights interpretation. This is in sharp contrast to
the stricter textual method to which they are accustomed.
1. Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 [hereinafter Act].
2. While the Human Rights Act applies throughout the United Kingdom, this article will
confine its discussion to English law, as the Act might affect the mixed common-law and civillaw jurisdiction of Scotland somewhat differently.
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I. Rights Adjudication in the United Kingdom and
the Human Rights Act 1998
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty dictates that any bill passed
through both houses of Parliament and receiving the Royal Assent
becomes law.' British courts must give effect to all legislation
notwithstanding conflicting common law, prior statutes, or international
obligations, as Parliament is sovereign and its will is supreme. Although
the interpretation of statutes has become rather sophisticated to allow
courts more latitude in shaping the law, the adjudicative process
nevertheless remains a highly formalistic one dedicated to discerning and
applying parliamentary intent.4 To strike down or invalidate an act of
Parliament would violate the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
therefore, the courts cannot engage in any substantive review of
legislation.' As courts are limited to a formalistic method of statutory
interpretation requiring them to give effect to the will of Parliament, they
lack the power to prevent determined legislative encroachments upon
liberties. 6 For the courts to review a statute for its compliance with
common-law or international human rights standards would be to judge
such acts in a substantive manner and possibly question the sovereign will
of Parliament.7
Consistent with this tradition, the British constitution completely
lacked any bill of rights restraining the legislature before the passage of
the HRA. The United Kingdom's accession to the European Convention
on Human Rights placed only international obligations upon the British
government, having no legal effect within domestic law. Without a
domestic remedy, the only available recourse for a litigant whose rights

3. "The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, according to which the legislature can make
or unmake any law whatever, has, since the constitutional settlement of 1688, constituted this
country's most fundamental legal norm." R. Mullender, "Parliamentary Sovereignty, the
Constitution, and the Judiciary" (1998) 49 N. Ire. L.Q. 138 [footnotes omitted]; Parliamentary
sovereignty could also be termed the "grundnorm" or "ultimate rule of recognition" of the
British constitution. G. Winterton, "The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy ReExamined" (1976) 92 L.Q. Rev. 591.
4. For a review ofjudicial formalism, see D. F. Partlett, "The Common Law as Cricket", Book
Review of Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law by P. S. Atiyah & R. S. Summers
(1990) 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1401 at 1409-1415, and for a comparison of formal and substantive
meanings of law, see P. Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An
Analytical Framework" 11997) Pub. L. 467.
5. A. W. Bradley, "The United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights, and
Constitutional Review" (1995) 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 233 at 234.
6. S. Wright, "The Bill of Rights in Britain and America: A Not Quite Full Circle" (1981) 55
Tulane L. Rev. 291 at 300-301.
7. V. P. Pace, "Partial Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights: The Canadian Model Offers a Viable
Solution to the United Kingdom's Bill of Rights Debate" (1998) 13 Conn. J. Int. L. 149 at 159.
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had been violated by an act of Parliament was to file a petition with either
the European Commission or, after 1998, the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg.' This approach usually results in a lengthy and
costly process.
Defenders of the constitutional status quojustified this situation on the
grounds of majoritarian politics and the flexibility it allows in legislating
for societal changes. They also argued that the United Kingdom already
provided adequate protections to rights.9 In contrast, supporters of a bill
of rights characterized parliamentary sovereignty as limitless government
power that provides no guarantees against human rights infringements. In
support of their argument, advocates pointed to the fact that the United
Kingdom has had one of the worst records before the European Court of
Human Rights. 10 In addition, they suggested that a domestic solution to
human rights claims would be cheaper, more efficient, and give greater
consideration to British legal culture than continued recourse to
Strasbourg." The debate over the need and desirability of a bill of rights
continued to grow over the past decade, producing lively and learned
discussions on the issue of what form of rights protection, if any, the
United Kingdom should have.
Three general models of rights protection were available for
consideration. The first, and most extreme, was full constitutional
entrenchment like the Bill of Rights in the United States. This type of bill
would be essentially absolute in its provisions, completely restricting
Parliament's ability to infringe protected rights and giving the judiciary
power to invalidate offending primary legislation. Both supporters and
opponents of a bill of rights rejected this option as too radical a departure
from British political and legal traditions.1"
A system based upon the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
was more popular among advocates. 3 Canada, whose government was
otherwise modeled on the-British doctrine of parliamentary supremacy,
8. J. A. Andrews, "The European Jurisprudence of Human Rights" (1984) 43 Md. L. Rev. 463
at 480-81, 487.
9. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, "A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom - The Case Against"
(1997) 32 Tex. Int. L. J. 435 at 437; Pace, supra note 7 at 168-69; C. Adjei, "Human Rights
Theory and the Bill of Rights Debate" (1995) 58 Mod. L. Rev. 17 at 32.
10. Pace, supra note 7 at 159.
11. See generally M. Zander, "A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom - Now" (1997) 32
Tex. Int. L. J. 441; Pace, supra note 7 at 162-63.
12. Pace, supra note 7 at 170-73, 187-89; S. Kentridge, "Parliamentary Supremacy and the
Judiciary Under a Bill of Rights: Some Lessons from the Commonwealth" [ 1997] Pub. L. 96
at 106-11; Mullender, supra note 3 at 146, 163,
13. M. L. Principe, "Dicey Revisited: Great Britain Joins the Fray in Examining Individual
Rights Protections in the Westminster System" (1993) 12 Wis. Int. L. J. 59 at 60; Pace, supra
note 7 at 177-78.
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included the Charter in its 1982 constitution. 4 Canadian courts have
since exercised the power to review and invalidate acts of Parliament for
substantive non-conformance with the Charter's provisions. The essential
distinction between the Canadian and American models is the Charter's
inclusion of a "notwithstanding" clause, which Parliament can expressly
invoke to override Charter provisions should it see the need. 5 The
Canadian model would offer the United Kingdom a substantial degree of
rights protection, while still respecting the core doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty. 16
A third model was that of New Zealand, which would be least
disruptive of British constitutional orthodoxy and thus garnered the most
political support.'7 Unlike the Canadian and American models, New
Zealand's Bill of Rights Act is a simple statute. 8 Subject to repeal at any
time, it requires the courts to interpret all subsequently enacted statutes
as compatible with its provisions. Nevertheless, it denies the courts the
power to declare legislation invalid. ' This model would therefore better
reflect the constitutional tradition of the United Kingdom than would the
American and Canadian ones. In 1997, after winning an overwhelming
majority in Parliament, the Labour Party carried through on its commitment
to a bill of rights and secured passage of the Human Rights Act modeled
20
on the New Zealand approach.
The Act incorporates most sections of the Convention into domestic
English law, subject to any reservations or derogations made by the
United Kingdom. 2' This blanket incorporation means that British courts
14. ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
15. Ibid., s. 33.
16. R. Penner, "The Canadian Experience with the Charter of Rights: Are there Lessons for
the United Kingdom?" [19961 Pub. L. 104 at 109-110.
17. Principe, supra note 13 at 63; H. Woolf, "Judicial Review - The Tensions Between the
Executive and the Judiciary" (1998) 114 L.Q. Rev. 579 at 592.
18. New ZealandBill ofRights Act 1990 (N.Z.), 1990, no. 109 [hereinafter Bill of Rights Act];
Human Rights Act 1993 (N,Z.), 1993, no. 82.
19. Principe, supra note 13 at 62; Bill of Rights Act, ibid., ss. 4, 6.
20. Pace, supra note 7 at 151-52.
21. Supra note l,s. I of theAct incorporates Articles 2 to 12 and 14of the Convention, Articles
I to 3 of the First Protocol, and Articles 1and 2 of the Sixth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to
18 of the Convention. The United Kingdom has so far made one derogation to the Convention,
declaring a public emergency under Article 15(1) in response to the situation in Northern Ireland.
It also made a reservation to sentence 2, Article 2 of the First Protocol respecting the right of
parents to ensure education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical
conventions. In incorporating the Convention, theAct omits Article 13, which states that anyone
whose rights and freedoms under the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation was committed by persons acting
in an official capacity. This article would likely violate the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
by allowing private persons to seek damages in the courts against public authorities for acts clearly
permitted by Parliament, or perhaps even against Parliament itself.
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must have increased regard for the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights in giving protection to those rights. Section 2 of the HRA
directs the English courts to "take into account" the decisions and
opinions of the European Court of Human Rights, the Commission, and
the Committee of Ministers. However, the section stops short of expressly
giving the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights the status of
binding precedent, thus reserving discretion to English courts in applying
them. Nevertheless, these decisions will now have considerably more
authority.

22

Sections 3 and 4 of the Act lay out the extent ofjudicial review. Section
3(1) states:
[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
23
the Convention rights.

In fact, courts have often employed a similar canon of statutory construction
to prevent conflicts between legislation and either common-law rules,
treaty obligations or other legislation. Section 3(1) now mandates such
interpretation and encourages the courts to push their interpretation of
legislation farther in seeking compliance with the Convention. Section
3(2) also makes it clear that even if courts find acts of Parliament
incompatible with the Convention, the legislation remains valid. Therefore,
the Act does not give the judiciary the power to strike down an act of
Parliament or ignore its express grant of administrative authority. Instead,
section 4 authorizes the judiciary to issue non-binding declarations of
24
incompatibility.
When a domestic court, or even the European Court of Human Rights,
finds a law incompatible, section 10 allows for a Minister, or the Queen
in Council, to order amendments to the legislation to remove the defect.
The fast-track amending procedure is available when a minister finds
22. H. Fenwick & G. Phillipson, "Public Protest, the Human Rights Act and Judicial
Responses to Political Expression" [2000] Pub. L. 627 at 640.
23. Supra note 1.
24. Supra note 1, s. 4(6)(b) stipulates that a statement of incompatibility also has no effect on
the parties to the proceedings. Geoffrey Marshall critically characterizes such a statement as
"not a legal remedy but a species of booby prize," useless to a litigant who should prefer to argue
for a favorably compatible interpretation of the law in question. He further suggests that the
desire to interpret legislation as compatible with the Convention will possibly lead courts to
give a thin reading to the rights in need of protection. G. Marshall, "Two Kinds of Compatibility:
More about Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998" [1999] Pub. L. 377 at 382 [hereinafter
"Two Kinds of Compatibility"] and "Interpreting Interpretation in the Human Rights Bill"
[ 1998] Pub. L. 167 at 170; Courts will have to review substantively not only parliamentary acts
and administrative actions, but will also have to interpret the scope of Convention provisions.
F. Bennion, "What Interpretation is 'possible' under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act
1998?" [2000] Pub. L. 77 at 86.
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compelling reasons for its use. This expeditious remedial alternative will
likely put considerable political pressure on the government to take action
and correct incompatible legislation. Incidentally, section 19 further
requires the responsible Minister, before the second reading of a bill, to
make a statement as to whether the bill is compatible with the Convention.
If the Minister declares that it is not compatible, he or she may nevertheless
urge Parliament to pass the legislation. 5
Another significant part of the Act is section 6(1) which provides that:
[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible
with a Convention right.2 6
Section 6(6) adds that a public authority may also act unlawfully by a
failure to act as required by the Convention. Interestingly, section 6(3)
classifies courts and tribunals as public authorities. This will mean that
courts cannot apply statute or common law in a way that contravenes the
Convention.2 7 This limitation will also restrict a court's power to award
remedies and damages. However, section 6(3) notably excludes Parliament
from its definition of a public authority, thereby preventing any claims
directly against it. Moreover, section 6(6) provides that an unlawful
failure to act does not include the failure to introduce legislation in
Parliament.
The remaining sections of the HRA are predominately procedural in
nature. As such, they will likely have little effect on larger constitutional
issues. While ultimately respecting parliamentary sovereignty, the Act
will nevertheless significantly impact institutional structures and
substantive law in the United Kingdom.28
II. Institutionaland Substantive Effects of the Human Rights Act
The HRA will influence the recognition of human rights in the United
Kingdom in two significant ways. First, it will have institutional effects
creating a constitutional atmosphere more congenial to rights protection.
Political pressures will restrict Parliament's ability to contravene
guaranteed rights while courts will exercise substantive review in
determining the compatibility of legislation with the Convention. The
adjudication of rights will accordingly shift from a formalistic to a more
25. Nicholas Bamforth suggests that section 19 might come to be considered as a manner and
form restriction on Parliament, which does not limit its substantive powers of legislation, but
does alter the constitutionally required procedure by which a bill passes through Parliament.
N. Bamforth, "Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998" [ 1998] Pub. L. 572
at 575, 577.
26. Supra note 1.
27. Sir J. Laws, "The Limitations of Human Rights" [1998] Pub. L. 254 at 262-63.
28. M. Elliott, "The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying
Judicial Review" (1999) 115 L.Q. Rev. 119 at 126-27, 128.
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substantive process. Secondly, incorporation of the Convention and case
law of the European Court of Human Rights introduces a more positive
rights jurisprudence and an adjudicative process that is also more
teleological. English courts will have to confront these differences and
reconcile them with a traditional common-law approach stressing negative
rights and judicial formalism.
1. InstitutionalEffects

The formalism of English adjudication has diminished considerably in
the past several decades with ultra vires judicial review. The ultra vires
doctrine allows courts to review acts of executive officers and
administrative agencies to ensure that their decisions are within
Parliament's statutory grant of authority. If a court finds that an
administrative action strays beyond the authority that Parliament has
delegated to the officer or public body, the courts will invalidate it as ultra
vires.

This limited measure of judicial review curtails administrative action
potentially detrimental to individual rights. In theory, when examining
administrative action, the courts only make sure that the challenged
decision falls within the delegated grant of authority without judging its
substantive merits. 29 However, courts have broadened the grounds on
which administrative actions are evaluated and have inferred a
parliamentary intent of rationality in the decision-making process. Courts
have thereby effectively engaged in some degree of substantive review.30
The HRA builds upon the ultra vires doctrine by allowing courts to
review parliamentary legislation in light of the Convention. Although
courts cannot strike down statutes, they may still aggressively scrutinize
legislation for compatibility.3 1 In doing so, courts will now have to
32
undertake a greater degree of substantive review.
While adjudication under both the ultra vires doctrine and the Act is
likely to be similar in that courts must ultimately give effect to Parliament's
intent, the implications of the Act for the constitutional order are farreaching.33 The HRA, as a regular statute, is subject to repeal by Parliament

29. J. Jowell, "Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review"
[19991 Pub. L. 448; C. Forsyth, "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the
Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review" (1996) 55 Cambridge L.J. 122 at 136-37;
Elliott, supra note 28 at 120, 123.
30. Jowell, ibid. at 453; J. E. Levitsky, "The Europeanization of the British Legal Style"
(1994) 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 347 at 350.
31. Lord Irvine of Lairg, "The Development of Human Rights in Britain under an Incorporated
Convention on Human Rights" [1998] Pub. L. 221 at 225.
32. Ibid. at 235.
33. S. Greer, "A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998" (1999) 24 Eur. L. Rev. 3 at 15.

226

The Dalhousie Law Journal

and its provisions are tailored to respect parliamentary sovereignty. For
example, sections 3(2)(b) and 4(6)(a) ensure that the judiciary's new
power to issue declarations of incompatibility are limited and subordinate
to Parliament in that they have no legal effect. Nevertheless, actual
practice under the Act will effectively limit Parliament. Strong political
pressures will come to bear on the Executive and Parliament should the
government attempt to repeal the HRA or seriously infringe upon
guaranteed rights.
A declaration of incompatibility by a court will also bring attention to
legislation that is in violation of the Convention and will no doubt
motivate political action to amend the offending statute.34 The provision
in section 19 that requires Ministers to give a statement to Parliament as
to whether a pending bill will or will not conform to the Convention
should further galvanize political pressure during parliamentary debate
to ensure that legislation will comply. Rights will therefore not only be
protected in post-enactment legal challenges but throughout the actual
law-making process. The political effects of the HRA might therefore
restrict the actions of the government far more than formal theory would
suggest.35
2. Substantive Effects
The HRA will not only introduce institutional changes into the British
constitution, but will also have implications for substantive law as well.
The Act's incorporation of the Convention and the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights will introduce a foreign approach to
some rights that is more positive in nature. However, its careful attempts
to preserve parliamentary sovereignty will still make it difficult to claim
a right requiring affirmative government action, rather than forbearance.
Section 2 of the Act provides that a court or tribunal must take into
account decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights. This
will greatly impact the judiciary's application of the Convention. English
courts had referenced the decisions of the European Court of Human
34. Greer writes thatjudicial statements of incompatibility will "thrust the legislative provisions
to which they attach into a half-way house between legality and illegality, the precise implications
of which are difficult to fathom." Greer, ibid. at 13, 15; Elliott, supra note 28 at 127; Bamforth,
supra note 25 at 573; Lord Woolf of Barnes, "The Civil Justice Framework for Incorporation of
the European Convention" (1997) 32 Tex. Int. L.J. 427 at 430-431.
35. Courts may very well consider ministerial statements of compatibility under the rule in
Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593, that they can consider legislative history and ministerial
statements made in Parliament when interpreting legislation. F. Klug, "The Human Rights Act
1998, Pepper v. Hart and All That" [1999] Pub. L. 246 at 271-72; A judicial statement of
incompatibility will also offer support for a claim before the European Court of Human Rights
should the Government fail to take corrective measures. Greer, supranote 33 at 13, 20; Lord
Irvine, supra note 31 at 226, 228.
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Rights even before enactment of the HRA. In doing so, they followed a
canon of construction to interpret statutes as far as possible to comply
36
with the United Kingdom's political obligations under the Convention.
Section 2 now requires English courts to give considerably more weight
to European Court of Human Rights decisions and the need for consistent
and logical development of the principles in the Convention will further
necessitate the incorporation ofitsjurisprudence. 37 This increased authority
of the European Court of Human Rights will further integrate English law
into a European wide legal system of rights.
While the adjudicative process in the United Kingdom is generally one
of formalism, there is a substantive aspect that does exist in common-law
rights jurisprudence. Rights exist as a negative concept thereby limiting
the state's power to encroach upon liberties.38 Although the common law
remains subject to modification by Parliament, it nevertheless limits
government power in two important ways. First, courts interpret statutes
consistently with the common law, assuming that Parliament would
never intend to violate it without a clear expression.39 Second, violations
of common-law liberties raise sharper political scrutiny of government
action. 4 This negative conception of rights fosters a view of society in
which individuals are free from government constraint or coercion, but
4
lack any affirmative claim of right. '
The European Court of Human Rights' approach to adjudication
includes a positive conception of rights. An example is provided by the
finding that Article 8 of the Convention, which establishes a right to
privacy, places an affirmative obligation upon member states to protect
personal privacy against infringements by third parties. The state can
therefore violate Article 8 not only by violating someone's privacy, but
also by failing to take steps to prevent other private parties, such as the
36. Such construction is based upon the presumption that, in ambiguous instances, Parliament
intends to legislate consistently with its obligations under the Convention and the European
Community. L. P. Carnegie, "Privacy and the Press: The Impact of Incorporating the European
Convention on Human Rights in the United Kingdom" (1998) 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 311
at 332; Lord Woolf, supra note 34 at 429.
37. "Two Kinds of Compatibility", supra note 24 at 378.
38. Lord Scarman, "Human Rights in an Unwritten Constitution" [1987] Denning L. J. 129
at 135.
39. Bradley, supra note 5 at 236; T. R. S. Allan, "Constitutional Rights and Common Law"
(1991) 11 Ox. J. L. Stud. 453 at 453-54.
40. The political culture of the United Kingdom has generally been sensitive to the protection
of rights, despite having no constitutional guarantees. "Instead, precedent, customs, conventions,
and Acts of Parliament collectively safeguard basic rights." Pace, supra note 7 at 151; Adjei,
supra note 9 at 22-23.
41. Lord Scarman, while applauding the common-law's defense of some rights, nevertheless
finds its inability to protect rights of a more positive nature to be a weakness. Lord Scarman,
supra note 38 at 135.
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press, from doing so.42 Nevertheless, the European Court of Human
Rights' interpretation of Article 8 potentially conflicts with the relatively
broad common-law conception of freedom of expression. In possible
anticipation of such a positive obligation, section 12 of the Act directs that
courts must give particular regard to the freedom of expression. While
there may be opportunity for reconciling these two concerns, possibly
through a margin of appreciation or the common-law doctrines of slander
and libel for instance, they reflect a fundamental difference in the
conception of rights.
A positive notion of rights might also expand the concept of the state
from that generally recognized in the political tradition of the United
Kingdom. In addition to persons or institutions that are actual instruments
of government policy, "public authority" under the Act could arguably be
interpreted so broadly as to encompass organizations receiving public
monies and support, or legislatively created bodies such as incorporated
businesses. As section 6 includes courts in the definition of public
authorities, the Convention could conceivably be applied to numerous
transactions between private parties." Not only would courts then be
under a duty to resolve private disputes in accordance with the Convention,
but the government might also have an obligation to regulate traditionally
private conduct.
The HRA aims to guarantee rights against government encroachment,
while maintaining the constitutional orthodoxy of parliamentary
supremacy. Therefore, the Act seems to contradict the notion that citizens
might rely on the Convention to claim a positive right from the state. The
Act's negative approach to rights is very much in the common-law
tradition, which has always been based upon the premise that everything
is allowed that is not prohibited according to law. The common law
shields individual liberty by restraining state action through procedural
safe guards and substantive principles." The Convention mirrors this
approach by guaranteeing rights to a fair trial and no punishment except
according to law in Articles 6 and 7. These rights do create positive
obligations of judicial process within an otherwise negative conception

42. Carnegie, supra note 36 at 334-35, 338-39; Laws, supra note 27 at 259.
43. See generally D. Oliver, "The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public
Functions under the Human Rights Act" [2000] Pub. L. 476; Laws, supra note 27 at 262-63.
44. It should again be noted that any restraint offered by common-law rights is only of a moral
nature and is not legally enforceable against Parliament in the courts; Lord Browne-Wilkinson,
supra note 9 at 436; Sir S. Sedley, "Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda" [1995]
Pub. L. 386; Allan, supra note 39 at 455-57, 462, 478; Winterton, supra note 3 at 599; Lord
Irvine, supra note 31 at 224-25; Jowell, supra note 29 at 455-56.
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of rights.45 However, procedural protections do not restrict the substantive
scope of Parliament's power or policy options, but direct the manner in
which it may exercise them. As Parliament remains sovereign, a claim to
46
require any sort of positive action against its will is doctrinally untenable.
The provisions of the HRA will make it difficult for any individuals to
claim positive rights under the Convention. Although section 6(l) makes
it unlawful for any public authority to act in a way incompatible with the
Convention, section 6(3) specifically excludes Parliament from the
definition of "public authority." In some instances, however, individuals
may be able to claim a positive right against public authorities using
section 6(6), which includes "a failure to act" within the definition of "an
act" for the purposes of the HRA. The courts could find that, unless the
enabling statute clearly provides otherwise, the HRA effectively imposes
positive obligations on public authorities. This interpretation could
maintain the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty by founding a positive
claim upon implied legislative intent.
The hierarchy between Parliament and subordinate public bodies
supports the idea that any positive rights ultimately derive from either
Parliament's actual creation of such a right or its implied acquiescence to
a claim directly under the Convention. Section 6(6) further guarantees
that any claim to a positive right cannot be asserted against Parliament,
as the failure to introduce legislation cannot be unlawful. Finally, the
HRA does not incorporate Article 13 of the Convention, requiing an
effective legal remedy for violations of its guarantees. TheAct' s exclusion
of this article therefore disallows claimants to seek relief based upon a
claim that the government has not satisfied a positive right.
Just as the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted some of
the ights in the Convention in a positive manner, its method of adjudication
is very different from English formalism. Whereas English courts have
traditionally focused upon statutory language when searching for
parliamentary intent, the European Court of Human Rights has taken a
teleological approach to the Convention. This interpretive approach has
a purposive outlook and seeks to fulfill the spirit or goals of the legal
regime involved. It is useful for applying the broad statements of
principle contained in the Convention, many of which are not well suited
to a formalistic and textually based approach to interpretation as found in

45. Laws, supra note 27 at 259-61.
46. Allan, supra note 39 at 455; In the English common-law tradition, "[tihe individual
citizen enjoys no legal rights as against the legislature, save the democratic right to vote out the
Government which passed the offending legislation so as to procure its repeal." Lord BrowneWilkinson, supra note 9 at 436.
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the common law.4 7 English courts will sometimes be able to avoid this
problem by relying directly upon the decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights. However, in instances when the law is vague or the
circumstances are novel, courts must have regard to the principles of the
Convention in their attempt to develop the law consistently and correctly.
Courts will first have to analyze a statute formalistically to discern
parliamentary intent and then review it substantively against the
Convention. Courts will therefore have to take into account the broader
purposes of the Convention when looking at its provisions to find their
meaning. These guiding ideals will be value-laden, intended to promote
48
concepts such as human dignity, equality, and pluralist democracy.
Conclusion
The HRA's incorporation of the Convention will have significant
implications for English law. The first effects will be upon the institutional
structure of the British constitution. Courts, armed with the power to issue
statements that a statute is incompatible with the Convention, will now be
able to substantively review acts of Parliament. Such a review will be a
break from the judiciary's formalistic tradition, although courts must
continue to determine parliamentary intent in order to apply it. Despite
having no legal effect upon the validity of the statute in question, a
statement of incompatibility will nonetheless place strong political
pressures upon the government to amend the legislation. In addition, the
HRA's requirement that ministers must issue a statement of a bill's
compatibility during the legislative process will provide a further obstacle
to Parliament's infringement of human rights. Although the HRA does
not impair the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, political pressure
and increased consciousness of rights in the political sphere will erect
practical, even if not theoretical, limits upon Parliament's legislative
powers.
Secondly, the incorporation of the Convention and the accompanying
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will also have a
substantive impact on English law. The interpretation given to some
rights by the European Court of Human Rights are positive in nature,
placing affirmative obligations upon the state to comply with the

47. Lord Irvine, supra note 31 at 232; This same judicial approach arises in the context of
European Community law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Levitsky,
supra note 30 at 348, 350-52; Bennion, supra note 24 at 81-82.
48. Lord Irvine, supra note 31 at 229, 233; Bennion, supra note 24 at 89.
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Convention. This notion of rights conflicts with the common-law idea of
negative rights, reflected in the Act, which will possibly make it difficult
for a claimant to pursue a positive right in the courts. Although positive
rights are foreign to the common-law concept of liberty and the state, the
courts' new powers of substantive review may allow them to derive new
principles and rules for positive claims that are uniquely suited to English
law. Along with its positive conception of rights, the European Court of
Human Rights also employs a purposive approach to interpretation.
Intended to promote the spirit of the Convention, this method differs from
the formalistic manner in which English courts determine the intent of
Parliament. Courts will have to consider such a purposive approach when
interpreting the Convention in order to develop a conception of rights
consistent with that of the European Court of Human Rights.
Institutional changes will be immediately evident but it may take some
time before the substantive effects of the Act begin to appear in English
jurisprudence. However, this paper concludes by offering one prediction:
the Act will re-invigorate the common law as a system for rights
protection. As a legal tradition premised upon both precedent and
continuing experience, the common law is simultaneously resilient in the
face of dramatic change and flexible in incorporating new ideas. The
common law is thus quite suited to embrace the European Convention on
Human Rights and weave it into its own fabric.4 9

49. Laws, supra note 27 at 264-65; Allan, supra note 39 at 461, 467-68, 471, 477-79.

